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-2Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicitly dynamic and
growth-relevant framework for relating changing income distributions in
less developed countries to their economic development performances.

To

introduce the basic point of this paper let us consider two hypothetical
situations.
First, let us suppose that two initially identical countries have the
following development histories:

Percentage of Labor Force in:
High Wage Jobs
Country

Low Wage Job"l

(W=2)

(W=l)

Rate of Growth of Modern
Sector ("Modern Sector
Labor Absorption Rate")

Both countries
initially

10%

90%

Country A later

20%

80%

100%

Country B later

30%

70%

200%

In both countries, the poor rece:lved the benefits of growth; but in country
B, twice as many poor benefited.
Development economists would almost certainly rate country Bas superior,
and development planners would seek to find out what

had brought about that

country's favorable experience and adopt those policies in their own countries.
It is hard to imagine that anyone would not prefer B to A.
Now let us consider another example.

Suppose we had some other infor

mation about the development histories of two hypothetical countries:

Country

Rat~:-of Growth

Both countries
initially
Country C
later
Country D
later

11%
22%

Share of Lowest 40%:
Level
% Change

Gini Coefficient:
Level
% Change

.363

.082

--

.333

.307

-8%

.133

+62%

-15%

.162

+97%

Country D grew twice as fast as country C.

However, its income distribution,

as measured by the Gini coefficient and income share of the lowest 40% ,
seems to be "worse" than in country C; that is, it would appear that the
rich benefited at the expense of the poor, whose relative income share
deteriorated.

A development economist might question whether

the higher rate of growth in country D was "worth it" in
terms of income distribution, and a well-meaning development planner seeking
to give very high weight to alleviation of inequality might ~;o so far as
to choose country C's policies over country D's.

In any case, the issue

is app~rently open to doubt here, whereas in choosing between countries A
and B, it was very clear cut.
In point of fact, country C is the same as country A and country D the
same as country B.

Real-world e~onomic development histories and policy

projections are often presented in both ways.

Yet, as this example illustrates,

how thP information is presented can have a dramatic influence on how we
feel about the outcome.
How can it be that the two sets of answers are so different?

It is

reasonable to assume that development economists and planners have inter
temporally consistent judgments about social welfare, i.e., each time we
ask for a comparison of two situations, one is always judged as either better
than, worse than, or equally good as the other, or we admit that we cannot
choose.

1

1

Assuming consistency of true preferences, then, it must be that

For instance, in choosing between two alternative distributions of the
same amount of income, many people would adopt the following decision rule:
a) If one Lorenz curve lies wholly above another, then the first
situation is preferred to the second;
b) If the two Lorenz curves coincide, then the two situations are
deemed equally good (or bad);
c) If the two Lorenz curves intersect, we require further information
before making a decision.
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there is someth ing about the way we process the two data sets in our
minds
which causes the problem .

More precise ly, if we were to specify more

carefu lly the decisio n rule we used in arrivin g at each of the two judgme
nts
for the type of econom ic develop ~ent illustr ated by this exampl e, we
would
probab ly find an inheren t conflic t between them.
This paper seeks: (1) To explore these decisio n rules more carefu lly
in a growth -releva nt framew ork; {2) To determ ine whethe r t h ere i s a "
natura 1"
or "inevi table" relatio nship between inequa lity in the distrib ution
of income
in a country and its econom ic de'lelop ment;

(3) To ascerta in when a

rising degree of inequa lity (as measur ed by a rising Gini coeffic ient
or
falling share of income receive d by the poores t 40% of the popula tion,
for
exampl e) can be interpr eted as a true "worsen ing of the income distrib
ution" ,
receivi ng negativ e weight in the social welfare judgme nts or person
s who
prefer econom ic develop ment pattern s which favor the poor, and when
it cannot;
and (4) To propose an alterna tive method ology for analyzi ng the distrib
ution of
the benefi ts of econom ic develop ment; this method ology decomp oses total
growth
into its compon ent parts indicat ing growth in average incomes within
well-d e
1
fined sectors and the growth in Gize of those sectors , thus telling
us who
gets the benefi ts of develop ment,
The specifi cation of the rules for arrivin g at judgme nts about the
distrib utiona l effects of econom ic develop ment is the subjec t of Section
I.
In Section II, we examine how the rules are or are not in confli ct
with each
of three very differe nt stylize d types of dualis tic econom ic develop
ment:
Modern__ Sec_1:_or Enlarge ment Growth , illustr ated above, where an econom
y grows
by enlargi ng the size of its mod~rn sector ; Modern Sector Enrichm ent
Growth ,
where the growth accrues only to a fixed number of persons in the monern
sector ; and Traditi onal Sector Enrichm ent Growth , where all of the
proceed s
of growth go to those in the traditi onal sector.

Section III analyze s how

measur ed inequa lity changes as each type of develop ment procee ds, thereby
telling us if the income distrib ution must inevita bly "worsen " in the
initia l

-5-

stages of economic development.

Then, in Section IV, we demonstrate how

these three stylized cases can be synthesized and present an alternative
methodology for measuring the distribution of the benefits of economic
growth.

Section V shows how the basic methodology can be extended to

treat more than two sectors and to recognize explicitly population growth;
the methodology derived here is also compared with an approa,:h recently
suggested by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974).

The paper concludes in Section

VI by summarizing the main findings of the paper as they relate to empirical
research.
I.

The Inequality Index and Axiomatic Approaches for Analyzing the
Distribution of the Benefits of Economic Growth

A.

The Inequality Index Approach
A prime issue of discussion in economic development and in other branches

of economics is the question of who receives the benefits of growth, or
more precisely, which economic or demographic groups receive how much.

There

is considerable agreement about the inadequacy of aggregate GNP growth as
the sole measure of economic development, for it fails to show whether the
poor share in the benefits or are left behind.

A number of distributionally

oriented studies have appeared in recent years, taking as their criteria
for inequality such indices as a Gini coefficient or the share of income
received by the lowest 40%.

1

On the basis of comparisons of these measures

at two or more points in time, larger measured inequality than before is
1

In addition to the many studies conducted in individual countries, a
now considerable number of studies have examined changing income distributions
in a number of countries. The interested reader is referred to the work of
Adelman and Morris (1971) Chenery et. al (1974), Cline (1973), Kuznets (1963),
Musgrove (1974), Paukert (1973)~ and Weisskoff (1970).
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reported- in many countries.
Implicit in many if not all of the recent studies is the judgment
that social welfare (W) is a positive function of the level of national
income (Y) and a negative function of the inequality in the distribution
of that income (I).

For example, taking the share of income of the lowest

40% of the population (S) as an index of equality and the Gici coefficient
(G) as an index of inequality, these studies would hold that:

(la) W = f (Y,S),

f

1

>

O,

f

>

0,

f

2

>

0

<

O.

or

(b) W = f (Y,G),

f

1

2

The existence of more than one easily calculable inequality index has
generated a great deal of discussion of which is the best to use, and the
various indices have undergone intensive examination.

1

With an occasional

exception, the investigations of the properties of inequality measures have
taken a static perspective, that is, they have focused on the measurement
on inequality at a point in time.

However, the distribution of economic

benefits in the course of economic development is inherently dynamic, re-.
ferring to a phenomenon that takes place over time, and is appropriately
measured by a dynamic index.

l

One good review of the properties of these various inequality measures
may be found in Sen (1973). For an attempt to characterize these various
indices in terms of their compatability with widely-shared judgments
about economic welfare, see Fields and Fei (1974).
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Do the customary indices retain their validity in a dynamic development context?

To answer this question, we must have some independent

criteria other than the inequality measures themselves for deciding whether
a given index does or not satisfy them.

If there is a direct correspondence

between changes in a particular inequality measure and changes in social
welfare according to these independent criteria, then there is no problem
in using that measure.

However, if there is disagreement between the inde

pendent criteria, and a given inequality measure--for example, one registering
an unambiguous improvement with the other suggesting ambiguity---then to re
solve the conflict we are impelled to reject either the measure or the criteria

I.B.

The Axiomatic Approach

1

In this subsection, I shall propose a set of criteria which have
substantial support in the econcmics literature.

The criteria proposed

here will be regarded as an axiomatic system, in that their validity will
be accepted without proof. 2 In Section II, we will see how these axioms
relate to the three stylized tyfes of economic growth mentioned above.
Let us begin by defining one income distribution as the same as another
1t the two have the same Lorenz curve, and one as more equal than another

if it Lorenz-dominates the other.

3

I will now suggest three propositions

1

Everything in this section should be understood as pertaining to real
incomes. Anything which changes relative prices paid by some groups but
1leaves their money incomes the same does not satisfy the ceteris paribus
~onditions of the three axioms presented below.

2

An axiomatic system must have two other characteristics besides
plausibility: the axioms must be consistent with one another and they must be
independent. Consistency is easily established by numerical example. In
dependence requires that it be possible to satisfy each two-way combination
without necessarily satisfying the third; this is also established by example.
3

·0ne Lorenz curve dominates another when it lies above the other at at lea:
one point and never lies below it. Since Lorenz curves are defined according
to income shares, the use of the Lorenz curve as the means of defining inequali1
implies that measured inequality is independent of the level of income. Note
that this does not mean that our feelings about inequality are invariant
with income level. For a perceptive analysis of changing tolerance for
inequality in the course of economic development, see Hirschman and Rothschild
(1973).
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about social well-being, which receive considerabl e support in the literature.
These ideas are rather uncontrove rsial, and I imagine others would share
them as well:
(2a) For any given Lorenz distributio n, social welfare is greater the
higher is the level of national income.
This axiom holds that if everybody is made better off by exactly the
same percentage, then society has achieved a higher level of social well-being.
It relies for its validity on the assumption that the basic goal of an economic
system is to maximize the output of goods and services received by each of
its members, and the more each receives, the closer the economic system is
toward fulfilling that goal.
(2b) For any given level of national income, social welfare is greater
the more equal is the distributio n of income, i.e., if one Lorenz curve
dominates another.
If the Lorenz curve of one income distrib~tio n A dominates that of
another distributio n B for the same level of income, it means distributio n A
can be obtained from distributio n B by transferring positive amounts of income
1
.
The judgment that such
from the relatively rich to the relatively poor.
transfers improve social welfare dates back at least to Dalton (1920).

One

possible justificatio n for this principle is diminishing marginal utility
of income, coupled with independent and homothetic individual utility functions
2
But these assumptions
and an additively separable social welfare function.
are not necessary for the affinnation of this axiom.
1
2

see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) and Fields and Fei (1974).
see Atkinson (1970).
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(2c) Social Welfare is greater for any Pareto improvement.
Ordinarily, we think that if somebody is made better off economically
and nobody is made worse off, then the sum total of happiness in society is
greater than before.

We should be clear just what this axiom implies, for

the key word in this axiom is the word "any".

Even if the richest man in

the country were the beneficiary of the Pareto improvement, the axiom would
hold that society is better off.

In other words, whatever weight we give

to relative income notions and envy of one's neighbors or compatriots,
acceptance of this axiom implies that the envy is more than counterbalanced
in our social welfare judgments by the increased happiness of the income
recipient.

1

The converses of each of these propositims are also assumed to hold.
Thus, for instance, a lower level of national income for a given Lorenz
distribution would imply reduced social welfare.
It is probably worth noting explicitly that the axiomatic system given
by criteria (2a-c) is incomplete in the sense that it does not tell us how
to compare all possible combinations of growth rates and distributional patterns
For example, if comparing two initially identical countries Mand N, M had
achieved a higher rate of growth than N but its income distribution was less
equal (i.e., Lorenz-inferior) to that of N, we could not use the above criteria
to determine which we would prefer mless the less equal income distribution
were the result of one or a series of Pareto improvements.
This is because M would be better by (2a),
1

For example, if a sudden increase in the world price of coffee increases
the income of a Latin American coffee-grower, and he buys a transistor radio
to celebrate, this axiom holds that there is a net gain in social welfare,
even if the grower's day-workers are envious of his good fortune.
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worse by (2b), and (2c) does not apply in this comparison, and the three
rules do not provide a basis for balancing the various effects.
It is evident that the implicit social welfare function rule (1) based
on inequality indices and the explicit but incomplete social welfare rules
(2) based on axioms are not identically equal.

They may,however, be the same

in practice, always yielding the same qualitative judgment for any given
growth pattern.

Whether or not they do depends on the nature of the economic

development and is the subject of Section II.
II. Changing Inequality in Three Economic Development Typologies
In this section, we construct models of three types of economic develop
ment and examine what happens to measured inequality when growth takes place.
We do not ask what produces this growth; there is a voluminous literature on
that.

Rather, we ask:

given that growth proceeds according to one of these

three patterns, what happens to inequality (a) as measured by conventional
indices, and (b) according to the three axioms.
Each of the models developed here is a simple dualistic model, divided
into two sectors:

modern and traditional. 1 The three stylized development

typologies considered here are defined as follows:

1 The two sectors might alternatively be thought of as skilled vs.
unskilled labor or urban vs. rural, or capital vs. labor.
As with ali dualistic models, the working assumption being made is that
the members of each sector are relatively similar to others in that sector
and relatively different from those in the other sector. That is, for a
two sector model to be useful, there must be a strong, although not
necessarily perfect, division between the sectors, as pictured:
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TABLE 1.

DEFINITION OF DUALISTIC DEVELOPMENT TYPOLOGIES

Development Typology

Distributio n of
the Labor Force
Between the Modem
Sector and the
Traditional Sector

Modern
Sector
Income

Traditional Sector
Enrichment

Remains the
same

Remains
the same

Rises

Modern Sector
Enrichment

Remains the
same

Rises

Remains the
same

Modern Sector
Enlargement

More workers in
modern sector

Remains
the same

Remains the
sa11ne

Traditional
Sector
Income

Frequency
Traditional sector wage dist?
butic

wage distributi

Wage
If, however, within-sect or inequality is very impor'tant relative to between
sector inequality, then a dualistic model loses much of its usefulness. Recent
work by Fishlow (1972) for Brazil and Fei and Ranis (1974) for Taiwan suggest
that variation in labor income is the most important source of income in
equality. This suggests that a high wage sector-low wage sector dichotomy
would be most relevant, and that a division according to functional shares
(labor vs. capital, for example) would be somewhat less useful. Accordingly ,
in the models in this paper, we shall regard the modern sector as synonymous
with high wages and the traditional sector as synonymous with low wages.
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There is no solid factual basis for determini ng which countries or
regions of the world most closely fit each typology.

However, general

impressio ns suggest that "tradit:f_o nal sector enrichmen t" may come closest
to describin g some of the socialist countries (China, Cuba, Tanzania) and
some Asian countries (Taiwan, Korea); "Modern sector enrichmen t" may typify
other parts of Asia (the Philippin es, Thailand) and the oil-rich countries
of the Middle East (Iran); and "ntodern sector enlargeme nt" might be the
cARe in much of sub-Sahar an Africa (Kenya, Nigeria at present). 1

Whether

or not the reader agrees with th~se particula r impressio nistic illustrat ions,
the actual classific ation of cour•.tries or regions is a matter of degree,
and can only be carried out after much more intensive analysis of more com
prehensiv e data than are now available .
We now consider each type in turn and then analyze their similarit ies
and differenc es.
A. Tradition al Sector Enrichmen t Growth
In the tradition al sector enrichmen t growth model, incomes in the tra
ditional sector are assumed to rise, incomes in the modern sector remain the
same, and the allocatio n of the labor force between the two sectors also remains
the same,

Intuitive ly, it would seem that the enrichmen t of the poorer class

would lead to greater equality in the distribut ion of income, and that the

1

In addition to these developme nt typologie s, it may be helpful to consider
two types of non-devel opment: the so-called "Fourth World" countries (Bolivia,
Chad, Banglades h), which if they are developin g at all, are growing at a very
slow rate; and the so-called "developm ent disasters " (Uganda at present, Nigeria
in the late 1960s) which by all accounts seem to have had negative growth.
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faster this type of growth proceeds, the "better" things are, both in terms
of level of income .and in terms of its distribution.

In fact, as is demon

strated in Appendix A, the inequality index approaches (eg. (la) and (lb))
and the axiomatic.approach (2) to social welfare are in full agreement for
traditional sector enrichment growth.
B. Modern Sector Enrichment Growth
In modern sector enrichment growth, incomes in the modern. sector rise,
while incomes in the traditional sector and the allocation of the labor
force between the modern sector and the traditional sector remain the same.
With this type of growth, there arises a conflict between the inequality
index approach and the axiomatic approach.
following theorem:

In specific, we have the

The higher the rate of modern sector enrichment growth:

(a) The higher is social welfare according to the axiomatic approach;
(b) There is an ambiguous effect on social welfare according to the
inequality index approaches.
This theorem is proven in Appendix B.
Why should this discrepancy arise?

When modern sector enrichment

growth takes place, three things happen:
(a) There is a Pareto improvement (in favor of those at the top);
(b) The rising incomes of those at the top imply a falling share of the
total for those at the bottom, whose incomes are not growing;
(c) The rising incomes of those at the top and constant incomes of
those at the bottom imply a rising Gini coefficient.
The axiomatic approach rates (a), the Pareto improvement, as a gain in social
welfare.

Since (b) and (c) do not signal less social welfare according to
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one of the other axioms, the axiomatic approach registers an improvement.
On the other hand, according to the inequality index approach, even if the
absolute level of income received by the poor remains the same, this approach
gives negative weight to a falling share received by the poor and the rising
Gini coefficient, and in this lies the source of the ambiguity.
C. Modern Sector Enlargement Growth
In the modern sector enlargement growth model, incomes in both the
modern and the traditional sectors remain the same but the modern sector gets
bigger.

In this case, we may derive the following result:

When the modern sector is small relative to the total population, the
higher the rate of modern sector enlargement growth:
(a) The higher is social welfare according to the axiomatic approach;
(b) There is an ambiguous effect on social welfare according to the
inequality index approaches.
However, once the modern sector is sufficiently large, the two approaches
are in agreement.

This theorem is proven in Appendix C.

Essentially, the ambiguity of the inequality index approaches in early
modern sector enlargement growth comes about because modern sector enlarge
ment affects only some of the poor, not all,

Consequently, those whose

situations are not improved by this type of growth, and who therefore remain
as poor as before, receive the same amount, but it is a smaller part of a
larger whole.

Furthermore, the faster the rate of this type of growth, and

hence the higher the level of national income, the smaller the fraction of
that income received by those left behind.

Since the inequality index

approaches give negative weight to the falling share of income received
by the lowest 40% (the composition of which is changing with modern sector
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enlargement growth) or to the rising Gini coefficient, and both of these
inequality indices register a "worsening" of the income distribution the
faster this type of growth proceeds, somebody evaluating this type of
economic development according to one of the inequality index approaches
might, depending on his particular decision rule f, claim to prefer a
situation with less modern sector enrichment growth, because the measured
income distribution would be "better."
It seems to me that the mor~ modern sector enlargement growth a country
experiences, the better its economy has performed, and I doubt very many
readers would disagree.

In terms of the examples of the introduction, this

means that whatever decision rule we use should rate the first situation (A
and C) as inferior to the second (Band D).

In this light, there is cause

for concern over the lack of correspondence between the social welfare and
inequality approaches, on two grounds.
First of all, there is the academic point that a "worsening" of the
measured income distribution during ~bdern sector enlargement growth should
not be interpreted as a bad thing.

Rather, the falling share of the lowest

40% (S) and rising Gini coefficient (G) which arise in this case are
statistical artifacts without social welfare content.

Thus, social welfare

functions, whether explicitly-stated or implicitly-assumed, of the form
(la) Ws
and

=

f(Y, S), f

1

>

0,

f

2

>

0
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which most of us use, are invalid for this type of growth, and it would be
far better fo set f

2

= 0 and look only at income levels.

We shall return

to these points in Section III.C.
Second, from a policy perspective, it is quite disturbing to consider
even the possibility that a real-world development economist or planner
might write scholarly papers or recommend particular economic measures in
support of a policy of less of this type of growth.

YetJ unfortunately,

we do find instances of writers who advocate that a certain type of economic
development or industrialization not be undertaken, because although the
project would add to national income and create high-paying jobs, it would
result in a less equal measured ~ncome distribution.
D. Summary of the Three Development Typologies
The changes in measured income inequality and the various social welfare
effects for each of the three economic development typologies are given in
Table 2.
There is definite agreement between the inequality index and the axiomatic
approaches to social welfare only for traditional sector enrichment growth.
As this type of development takes place, the higher is the level of income
(Y), the higher is the share of income received by the poorest 40% of the
labor force (S), and the lower is the Gini coefficient (G), and hence the
higher is the level of social welfare according to both approaches.
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For modern sector enrichment growth, there arises a discrepancy.
During this type of development, Y is higher, but there is also greater
measured inequality (lower S, higher G), and therefore an ambiguous effect
on social welfare according to the inequality index approach.

However, the

three axioms postulated above indicate an unambiguous welfare improvement
for this type of growth.
Finally, for modern sector enlargement growth, there is also a
discrepancy.

While this type of development is taking place and Y increases

steadily, inequality follows the familiar"inverted-U" pattern, first rising
and then falling.

During the firi:;t stage when measured inequality is rising,

the social welfare effect of ecouomic growth is ambiguous according to the
inequality index approach.

As with the other cases, the axiomatic approach

shows an unambiguous welfare gain.
We turn now to an analysis of these effects.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF WELFARE EFFECTS FOR THREE TYPES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
TYPE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

WELFARE EFFECT

Modern Sector
Modern Sector
Traditio nal Sector
Enrichm ent Growt~h=----~E~n~r~i~c=h~m~e=n~t=--G~r~o~w~t=h=---~E~n~l~a=r~g~e_m_e_n_t_G_r_o_w_t_h
Rises

Income Level (Y)

Rises

Rises

Share of Income
Received by
Poorest 40% (S)

Rises

Falls

Falls while tradi
tional sector is more
than 40% of labor
force, rises there
after

Gini Coeffic ient (G)

Falls

Rises

Rises while modern
sector is small,
then falls

Effect on Social
Welfare Accordin g
to Inequal ity
Index Approach (1)

Unambiguous
improvem ent

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Effect on Social
Welfare Accordin g
to Axiomat ic
Approach ( 2)

Unambiguous
improvem ent

Unambiguous
improvem ent

Unambig uous
improvem ent
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On

the Inevitability of a "Wcrsening" Income Distribution in the

Course of Economic Development
A.

Is It Inevitable?
Kuznets (1955) observed that i.n a number of currently

developed countries, it appears that measured
income inequality seems to rise at first with economic growth and then falls
at higher levels of development, producing an "inverted-U" pattern.

Ever

since, economists have wondered whether such a relationship exists in the
currently-developing countries as well.

Initial evidence comparing measured

inequality across countries was consistent with the "inverted-U" pattern,
although only a small percentage of the variance in inequality can be explained
by income level alone.

1

Further study of individual less developed countries

over time has in many cases confirmed this pattern.

2

These findings have led many development economists to ask whether
an "inverted-U" pattern is inevitable in the course of economic development,
or as the question is usually phrased:
before it gets 'better'?"

"Must income distribution get 'worse'

The time paths of measured inequality for each

of the three pure models of dualistic economic development are shown in
Figure 1.

It is apparent that the path of measured inequality depends on

t h e ~ of economic development as well as its leyel.

More specifically,

on the inevitability issue, we have:

1Kuznets (1955) and Oshima (1962) originally proposed the "inverted-U"
patten1 and presented evidence from several countries. Since then, several in
vestigators have compiled additional cross-country data. Such data typically
support the "inverted-U" pattern. Paukert (1973), far instance, found that
"there is an increase in inequality as countries progress from the below $100
level to the $101-200 level and beyond •.• the peak of inequality is reached on
attainment of the level of development and the structural pattern characterized
by the countries ••• which in the neighbourhood of 1965 had a GDP per capita in
the $201-500 range." Before regarding such a pattern as inevitable, though,
even in the cross-section, we should note that the fit is far from perfect:
using Paukert' s data,, I regressed the Gini coefficient on GDP-per-capita and
GDP-per-capita squared (i.e., a pe.rabolic regression) and found that income
level can explain only 11% of the inter-country variance in inequality as
measured by the Gini coefficient.
2

The latest compilation of data for within-country comparisons may be
found in Ahluwalia (1974).
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(i)

Tradi tiona l Secto r Enrich ment Growt h.

If a count ry choos es

ment growt h, then
to devel op along the lines of tradi tiona l secto r enrich
ssiv1: ; ly "bett er".
ceter is parib us its incom e distri butio n will get progre
over time.
(ii)

Modern Secto r Enrich ment Growt h.

If a count ry choos es to

h, then ceter is
devel op along the lines of moder n secto r enrich ment growt
"wors e" over time.
parib us its incom e distri butio n will get progr essiv ely
(iii)

Modern Secto r Enlarg ement Growt h.

If a count ry choos es to

growt h, then ceter is
devel op along the lines of moder n secto r enlarg ement
" patte rn.
parib us its incom e distri butio n will follow an "inve rted-U
(iv)

r
Switc h from Modern Secto r Enrich ment to Tradi tiona l Secto

Enrich ment Growt h.

If a count ry first choos es to develo p along the lines

to a strate gy of
of moder n secto r enrich ment growt h, and then switc hes
butio n will also
tradi tiona l secto r enrich ment, then its incom e distri
follow an "inve rted-U " patte rn, ce,ter is parib us.
". then
The quest ion of an inevi table initi al stage of "wors ening
gies (iii) and (iv)
comes down to the inevi tabil ity of develo pment strate
as oppos ed to (i) and (ii).

At the prese nt time, there is no hard

count ries.
evide nce on which patte rns are being follow ed in which

Furth er.

ality has fallen in
resea rch now under way on Taiwa n, where measu red inequ
2 may shed some light
1
recen t years , and on Colom bia, where it has risen ,
on this issue .

1

See Fei, Ranis , and Kuo (1975 ).

2

See Berry (1974 ).
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FIGURE 1

CHANGING INEQUALITY DURING THREE TYPES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

Measured
Inequality

!
(a)

Trctditional sector
enrichment growth

Income
Level
Measured
Inequality

(b)

Modern sector
enrichment growth
Income
Level
Measured
Inequality

(c)

Modern sector
enlargement growth

Income
Level
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B. If It Happens, Why?
Kuznets' original hypothesis was that the "inverted-U" pattern is
caused by the transfer of workers from the rural sector, where incomes are
relatively equally distributed at low levels, to the urban sector, where
there is greater income dispersion, owing to the presence of a skilled
professional class at the top and poor recent migrants at the bottom.

In

terms of the development typologies analyzed above, Kuznets' model is
basically one of modern sector en~argement growth with within-sector inequality.

Allowing for within-sector inequality in the context of the

modern sector enlargement growth model, and taking the Gini coefficient as
our measure of inequality, it may be demonstrated that the "inverted.;...U"
pattern always arises in modern sector enlargement growth, regardless of the
relationship between the Gini coefficients within the modern sector and the
traditional sector; this is proven in Appeniix D.

1

These results add another dimension to Kuznets' explanation for the
"inverted-U" pattern, namely, that the transfer of workers from the low
income sector to the high income sector produces an "inverted-U" pattern
which is a statistical consequence of modern sector enlargement growth.
This leads us to ask whether this statistical pattern in modern sector en
largement growth truly signifies in an economic sense that "the distribution
of income must get worse before it gets better."

1

We take this up in Section C.

Probably the most important assumption producing this result is that
the within-sector income distributions remain the same. See Appendix D for
a description of the assumed conditions.
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C.

If It Happens, Is It Bad?
If in the course of economic development , measured inequality in the

distributio n of income rises, is it necessarily bad in social welfare
terms for those who prefer a more equal distributio n of any given amount
of income to a less equal one?

To answer this question, we must examine

the various factors which affect our judgments based on inequality
indices and the axiomatic .approach respectivel y.

These basic welfare

effects have been summarized in Table 2 and Section II.D.
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The reader may find the ambiguities in the cases of modern sector
enrichment and enlargement at least somewhat discomforting.

At first, it

might seem that a falling share gcing to the poor (S) or a rising Gini
coefficient (G) should receive negative weight in a social welfare
judgment, possibly negative enough to outweigh the rising level of income.
But why?

There are at least two possible answers.

Implicitly, we may have in mind that a falling Sor rising G implies
that the poor are getting absolute.!Y_ poorer while the rich are getting
absolutely richer, and many of us would regard this as a bad thing indeed.
The problem with this notion is that it confuses cause and effect, that is
to say, absolute emiseration of the poor would definitely imply falling
Sand rising G, but as we have just seen, Scan rise and G can fall without
the poor becoming worse off in absolute terms.
Ruling out the necessity of absolute emiseration of the poor as
a reason for reacting adversely to a falling Sor a rising G, we may
instead have in mind something of a relative income notion, that a rising
gap between rich and poor is in and of itself a bad thing, not because the
poor have lower incomes but rather because a wider percentage gap between
rich and poor might make the poor feel worse off.

As we observed when we

first stated the third axiom, if we accept its universality, the axiom
implies that any Pareto improvement leads to higher social welfare, so
that any negative weight we give to envy of the rich by the poor is
more than offset in social welfare terms by the gain in utility of the
income recipients themselves.
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In the case of modern sector enrichment growth, this relative
income argument has some validity.

It is plausible that, contrary to the

third axiom, income growth concentrated exclusively in the hands of
the rich might be interpreted as a socially inferior situation as compared
with the rich having less and the poor the same amount.

Howe,rer, in the

case of modern sector enlargement growth, there is not even this defense
to fall back on.
As we have seen, a rising G and falling Smay be a perfectly natural,
and even highly desirable, outcome for this type of development.

In this

case, the specification of social welfare functions of forms like (la) and
(lb) apparently conflicts with our ideas of social well-being.
From this analysis of the various types of economic development
and their relationships to measured income inequality and social welfare,
we may observe that a falling share of income received by the poorest 4n7o
(S) and rising Gini coefficient
(a)

(Gl

can be the result of:

Traditional Sector Impoverishment, which is clearly bad in

social welfare terms; or
(b)

Modern Sector Enrichment, which is good according to the

axioms presented above, but can be plausibly challenged on relative
income grounds; or
(c)

Modern Sector Enlargement, which is good according to widely

acceptable axiomatic judgments.
The

practical implication of this finding is clear:

before we

can legitimately interpret a rising inequality coefficient in a country
as an economically-meaningful ''worsening" of the income distribution rather
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types of
than a statis tical artifa ct, we must know which of the three
econom ic develo pment patter ns that countr y has been follow ing.
conve rse of this statem ent does not hold.

The

That is, for a countr y which

ality,
has been growin g and has also experi enced fallin g measu red inequ
declin ing
we need not resort to develo pment typolo gy to evalua te it -good thing
measu red inequ ality with growin g tncome is unamb iguous ly a
in terms of our axioms .
Of course , no real-w orld countr y is a pure case of any of these
ology
three types, and it is necess ary, theref ore, to devise a method
y fits, and
for determ ining which of the three typolo gies it most closel
.
hence how to analyz e the distri bution al conseq uences of frowth

This is

the task of Sectio n IV.
IV.

dology
A Synth esis of the Three Pure Cases and an Analy tical Metho
ns
In this sectio n, we synthe size the three pure models of Sectio

hution of
II and III and sugges t a method ology for analyz ing the distri
the benef its of growth .

Lettin g year 1 be the base year and year 2 the

modern and
termin al year, denoti ng the labor force freque ncies in the
tive
tradit ional sector s by fm and ft respec tively , and their respec
wages by

\111

and Wt, we have:
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Year 1
Number of persons
in traditional sector

Year 2

ft

1

ft
2

Number of persons
in modern sector

fm
1

fm
2

Wage in traditional
sector

wt

1

wt
2

~

~

Wage in modern
sector

In each year, national income (Y) is:

Taking the first difference of (3), the change in income between the two
years is the sum of four terms which have the following economic meaning:
(4)

t:,Y = (f

m

\..

2

m
• .m
- f ) (w 1
1

--..--

w1t )
~

Modern sector
enlargement effect
{a)

"

;....,,.

.m m
+ (W2m - l•\)fl

'---v----'"

Modern sector
enrichment effect
(S)

_,,

'--.-. ---#·

Interaction between
Traditional sector
.modern sector enlarge enrichment effect
ment and enrichment
effects
(y)

(5)

It is easily verified that for the three pure cases of Section II,

a=

t:,Y,

s= y= o=

0

for modern sect_,r enlargement growth,

s=

t:,Y'

a• y= o=

0

for modern sector enrichment growth, and

o=

t:,Y'

a= s= y=

0

for traditional sector enrichment growth.

In the mixed case, the percentage of gr 0 wth attributable to each
of the pure cases depends on changes in the economy's wage structure and
occupational structure over the development period.
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A comparative static analysis of equation (4) reveals:
(a)

The modern sector enlargement effect (a) is greater:
(i)
(ii)

The greater the increase in modern sector employment; and
The greater the difference between modern sector and
traditional sector wage rates.

(b)

The modern sector enrichment effect (8) is greater:
(i)

The greater the rate of increase of modern sector
wages; and

(ii)
(c)

The more important the modern sector in total employment.

The traditional sectm~ enrichment effect (o) is greater:
(i)

The greater the rate of increase of traditional sector
wages; and

(ii)

The more important the traditional sector in total employment.

Note that negative enlargement and enrichment effects are both
possible.

Negative enlargement would occur when a sector shri·:iks in size,

while negative enrichment would result when real incomes in that sector
fall.
Total income growth can be positive while either of t~ese effects
are negative.

For example, a ten percent growth.rate in a sector might

result from either (i) a 20% rise in the size of the sector, coupled with
a 10i.'. fall in average wages, or (ii) a ?.n~t rise in average wages, accompanied
by a 10% decline in number of persons in that sector.

This example should

make clear that onr qualitative judgments about thedesirabilit y of any
particular sector growth rate depend crucially on the enlargement and en-
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richment components of that growth; examination of the
sector growth rate is not enough.

1

To illustrate how these ideas might be applied, suppose we had
obtained the following data from a less developed country at two different
points in time:
Year 1

Year 2

ft = 80
1

ft= 40

fm = 20
1

fm = 60

wt= $1
1

wt = $1 1/2

~ = $2

if!2

=

y

= $240

1

2

2

2

2

$3

(Here the wages~ and Wt should be thought of as the average wages paid
in the modern and traditional sectors respectively.)

Before calculating

either the conventional inequality indices or the various enlargement
and enrichment effects given by equation (4), let us examine the raw data
themselves.

1

We note three "facts":

consider statements of the form "Income of the richest X% grew
by A% but income of the poorest Y% grew by only B% (less than A); there
fore, income growth was disproportionately concentrated in the upper
income groups." This interpretation is correct if average income among
those who were originally the richest X% of the people rose much faster
than among those who were originally the poorest Y%. However, the inter
pretation is incorrect if what mainly happened was that the high income
sector expanded to include more people. From data on income growth of
the richest X% and poorest Y%, we cannot tell which.
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(a)

The size of the modern sector tripled.

(b)

Wages paid in the modern sector and in the traditional sector both
increased by 50%.

(c)

National income doubled.
From these facts, we might expect to find the following.

First

the tripling in size of the modern sector suggests that modern sector
enlargement will be found to have been an important component of this hypothetica
country's economic growth.

Also, the fact that wages increased substantially

in both sectors suggests that both the modern sector and the traditional
sector enrichment effects will prove to be important; however, since the
percentage increase in wages was less than the percentage growth of the
modern sector, these effects will probably not be as large as the modern
sector enlargement effect.

Furthermore, since the two wage rates increased

by the same percentage, their respective contributions to growth should he
about the same. finally, since the ratio of modern sector to traditional
sector wages stayed the same (two to one), measured inequality should
remain at more or less the same level.
Turning now to the calculations, it turns out that each of these
expectations holds except one---that relating to measured ineq-uality.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the two Lorenz curves cross.

Despite this,

the Gini coefficient registers a percentage increase of 50h an<l the
share of the lowest 40% falls by 25%.
greater by both measures.

Measured inequality is ·_narkedly
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Should we interpret the higher measured inequality as an economically
-meaningful worsening or a statistical accident?

This depends on whether

or not modern sector enlargement is an important part of the growth pattern.
Decomposing the income growth, we find:
a= Modern sector enlargement effect

=

S40

S = Modern sector enrichment effect

=

20

y = Interaction between modern sector
enlargement and enrichment effects

=

M)

o = Traditional sector enrichment effect=

20

AY

Total income growth

=$i20

Note that the modern sector enlargement effect (a) is equal to the
sum of the other pure effects (8 and o) combined. This suggests that the modern
sector enlargement growth model better characterizes the country's development
pattern than either of the others, and that we should therefore interpret
changes in the conventional inequality measures in this hypothetical
case with a great deal of care.
We turn now .to some extensions of the model.
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FIGURE 2.

LORENZ CURVES AND INEQUALITY INDICES FOR A HYPOTHETICAL ECONOMY.
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Gini coefficient

.10

.15
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Share of poorest 40%

.333

.250

-25%

Inequality Measure
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V. Extensions of the MethodologyIn this section, we ebow how tne general methodology- mSiY' be extended
to al.low for di vision of the economy into more than two sectors and to
recognize population growth explicitly.

We also compare the methodology

derived here with that suggested in a recent paper by Ahlmralia and
Chenery (1974).
A. Extension to n Sectors

In practical applications, the strict division of an econany into a
modern sector and a traditional sector m9iY' be lmsatisfactory, and a finer
breakdo\m mSiY' be more desirable, fo1· instance, into a moderri urban sector,
a traditional urban sector, and a traditional agricultural sector.

In general

with n sec~rs, national income (Y)i.s

iilw1 r •

(5) y =

The change in national income between the initial year (year 1) and terminal
year (year 2) is
,
n __i j.
(6) t:J.Y = Y - Y = t w: t
2
1 i=l 2 2
which• when re-written
(7)

l:J.Y

::i

y

1i1

8.1,l

(w;r; - ~fi)'

enables us to measure the contribution of the i 1 th sector to total growth.
'lb distinguish each sector's enl.argement · and enrichment effects and the

interaction between them, (7) m9iY' be manipulated to yield
( 8)

l:J.Y

=

iil

[Wi ( f~

-

fi)

'----v--------'
Sector i
enlargement
effect

+

(w!-wi)
'\.,,

....

fi+ (w!-wi) (.r;-s)]
,,

\,

~

.I

Sector i
Interaction of
enrichment sector i enlarge•ent
and enrichment effects
effect

The results of the comparative static analysis of the two sector case (equation
(4)) carry over to the n-sector case in an analogous manner.
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Besides extensio ns to more than two sectors the methodo logy develope d
I
here mey- be carried over as well to more than two income sources • or to a 'p;fbrid
classifi cation of sectors and sourcese

For example , it might be usef'u'.l to

measure income growth in the followin g six groups:
( i) Labor income among modem sector workers in urban areas
(ii) Labor income among traditio nal sector workers in urban areas

(iii) Labor income among traditio nal sector workers in agricult ure
(iv) Capital income in urban areas
( v~ Capital income in rural areas.
(vi) Other income

With such an extended methodo logy, we a.re limited only by restrict ions
of data and our own ingenui ty.
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B. Explicit Recognition ot Population Growth
It is a straightforward matter to give explicit recognition to
Total income growth (AY) mq be thought to have two

population growth.

components: (i) A population growth effect (P) • defined as the expansion
of the economy to absorb a growing l'()pulation at the initial occupational
and wage structure. and (ii) A net growth effect (N) • which results from
higher wages and a higher proportion of the population employed in highpqing activities.

Let fi be the number of persons in sector i and p the

'

rate of growth of population betweer, years l and 2.

Then net growth ( income

growth net of population) is given by:

(9) N = AY .p
n
__i i
i. i
Il
__i, i
• i~l (~:f2 - Wlfl) - iE1 ~flp

-

ai:id can be decomposed into its various net effects as

~ [Wifi - Wit(
)]
( 10 ) N = i~l
2 2
1 t 1 i+p

- 1l1c['Wi:(r;-rf<1 +p>]
'

V'

+

_,

Sector i net
enlargement effect

Sector i net
enrichment effect

Interaction of secto~ i
net enlargement and enrichment
effects
It:-is interesting to note that a sector can have a negative~ net enlargement
effect if its labor absorption rate is less than the rate of growth of popu
lation over the same period.
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c.

The Ahluwal.ia.-Chenery Growth Index in Three Development Typologies

In a recent paper, Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) have constructed an
explicitly dynamic and distribution&.l.ly-oriented technique for evaluating
economic growth.

The essence ot their approach is to give greater weight

to income growth if it is received by the relatively poor then by the rela.ti vely rich.

Specifically• they divide the econo?ey" into quintile groups•

ordered from lowest incane to highest, and a.asign non-increasing weights to the
income growth of each successive quintile, i.e.,
(ll) Ahluwal.ia.-Chenery Index= 8l_! ++ 62w + s w + g w + g w ,
2
4 4
1
3 3
5 5
i
i
i
where s = (Y - Y )/Y for the 1 1 th quintile
1
2
1
1

The Ahluwal.ia.-Chenery Index wo,rks very well for the two enrichment
development typologies• but less well for modern sector enlargement.

To

investigate these relationships• let us consider a simple ten person economy
with an initial income of twelve• an income growth of one dollar, and three
alternative distributions among indi.viduals (see Table 3).

The Ahluwal.ia.

Chenery measures, the Gini coefficients, and the rankings according to the
inequality index and axiomatic approaches for the three development types a.re
given below.
Let us begin by examining the two enrichment types of growth.

The ideal

data. base for analyzing the distribution of the benefits of economic growth
would be data on the same people at two points in time (so-called longitudinal
or panel data).

If we had such data., a.s in Panel (A) of the table, we could

calculate the income growth of those persons who were originally in each income
quintile, and weight these by the a.:r1propriate welfare weight w to obtain the
1
Ahluwalia.-Chenery Index.

In the hY1>0thetical traditional sector enrichment

pattern of Table 3, we see that persons in each of the four lowest quintiles
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If, for example, our subjectively chosen weights were w =.40, w =.30, w =.20,
1
2
3
w =.06, w =.04, the Ahluwalia-Chenery index would have the numerical value of
4

5

0.12.

l

The corresponding value for modern sector enrichment growth is 0.02.

Thus, the Ahluwa.J.ia-Chenery Index considers the traditional sector enrichment
pattern superior to modern sector enrichment.

This accords with both the axiomat:

approach and the inequality index approach (see Panel (C) ).
In pae.ctice, however, census data or awnple surveys in less developed

countries do not genera.J.ly chart the same people over time.
two comparable cross sections.

At best, we have

Panel (B) is t1ued on the same information as

Panel (A), except that it is in the :familiar form of incomes received by decile
groups.

For the two enrichment growth types, Panels (A) and ( B) are identical,

as are the Ahluwalia-Chenery indexes computed from them.

In this sense, the

Ahluwalia-Chenery index serves very well for these types of development, for
both longitudinal and cross-sectional data.
Turning now to modern sector enlargement growth, the results a.re disap
pointingly mixed.

For the longitudinal data. (Panel (A)), modern sector enlarge

ment growth shows up at least as w~ll as the same amount of traditional sector
enrichment growth, which conflicts with both the inequality index and axiomatic
approaches. 2

1

The choice of strictly monotonically declining weights is deliberate.
Ahluwalia and Chenery's "equal weights" scheme would have produced the same index
for each development type.
2

Since it is arbitrary- which poor person's income was increased by being
drawn into the enlarged modern sector, we should probably use the average weight
which we give to income growth among the four lowest quintiles, which is (w + w +
2
1
w + w )/4. If we were to use the welfare weight for the poorest quintile, since
4

3

all are equally poor, the Ahluwalia-Chenery index would actually be greater for
modern sector enlargement growth than for the same amount of traditional
sector enrichment growth.
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If, instead, our de.ta had come to us as comparabl e cross sections, we
would have gotten a very different result (see Panel (B)).

The income growth

appears to occur in the fourth quintile only, with no growth in the first three.
This results in a substanti ally lower value for the Ahluwalia -Chenery Index
than from the "true" longitudi nal data, and results also in the
placement of modern sector enlargeme nt in an intermedi ate position.
The intermed iate ranklng of modern sector enlargeme nt grovth depends on the
specific numerical values.

In the extreme case mentioned by Ahluwalia and

Chenery, in which w =l (concern only with the poorest quintile) , modern sector
1
enlargeme nt growth would receive a weight of zero irregardl ess of whether no
poor persons, one poor person I or sh: poor persons were absorbed into an enlarged
modern sector.

This is hardly a desirable property for a growth index to have.

In general, however, the Ahluwalia -Chenery index does assign an interme
diate ra.nk to modern sector enlargeme nt growth, which accords with the other
approache s.

A number of other problems remain.

First, the lower value found

from longitudi nal de.ta tends to bias our Judgments away from modern sector
enlargeme nt patterns and in favor of llX)dern sector enrichmen t patterns.

We can

imagine for instance that if tradition al sector enrichmen t had been infeasibl e
due to political or resource constrain ts and if a modern sector enrichmen t policy
had yielded a slightly higher income, we might have mistakenl y
choose that strategy over one of modern sector enlargeme nt.

been led to

Second, it seems

unreasona ble that the income growth should be recorded in the fourth quintile,
with zero income growth among the lowest 60%.

And third, we are left with the

nagging suspicion that in modern sector enlargeme nt growth the quintile income
growth rates and the resulting Ahluvalia -Chenery Index do not seem to be measur
ing what they are really intended to measure -

the extent of income growth among

persons (or families) in various positions in the income distribut ion.

I

-39In summary, for the three development typologies , we may conclude that the
Ahluwalia-Chenery index is useful for both types of enrichment growth (modem
sector and traditional sector) end f'or both types of data (longitudinal end
comparative cross section).
growth 1·emains to be proven.

However, the validity for modern sector enlargement
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TABLE 3.

HYPOTHETICAL DATA ILLUSTRATING THE AHLUWALIA-CHENERY INDEX.

Panel (A) - Longitudinal Data
New Income Pattern Under:

Original Income Pattern
Person

Income
Originally

T1•ad. Sector
Enrichment

Modern Sector
Enrichment

Modern Sector
Enlargement

A

l

1.125

l

2

B

l

1.125

1

1

C

1

1.125

1

1

D

l

1.125

1

1

E

l

1.125

1

l

F

1

1.125

1

1

G

1

1.125

1

1

H

l

1.125

1

l

I

2

2

2.5

2

J

2

2

2.5

2

Total

12

13

13

13

Ahluwalia-Chenery Index
Computed from This Data
General
Specific
(w =.40, w =. 30,
2
1

.12

.12
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED

Panel (B) - Data from Comparable Cross Sections
Original Income Pattern
Decile
Income
Originally
l
2

1
l

3
4

1
1
1

5
6

Trad.·Sector
Enrichment

New Income Pattern Under:
Modern Sector Modern Sector
Enrichment
Enlargement

1.125

l
l

l
1

1

1

l.l25
1.125
1.125

1

1
1
1

1
1

1

l

1.125
1.125

2
2

1.125
1.125

l

l

l

7
8
g

1
2

2

2.5

10

2

2

12

13

2.2
13

Total

2

13

Ahluwalia-Chenery Index
Computed from This Data
General

.5w

.l2 5 (wl+w2+ w3+w4)

Specific
.12
(w =• 40, w =. 30,
1
2
w =.20, w =.06,
4
3
w =.04)
5
Rank according to the
l
Ahluwalie.-Chenery Index
Panel (C) - Inequality Indices
Rate of growth
Gini coefficient

8.3%
1

Rank according to
inequality index approach
Rank according to
axiomatic approach
1

5

e02

.5w 4
.03

3

2

8.3%

8. 3%
.162

.024

.184

l

3

a

l

3

2

rhe Gini coefficient of the original distribution is .134.

-42VI. Conclusion
This paper has sought to develop an explicitly dynamic and growth-relevan t
framework for analyzing the distribution of the economic benefits of growth.
Three stylized models of dualistic economic development were considered: (a)
Traditional sector enrichment, in which a country develops by raising the
incomes of workers in its tra.ditionu.l sector; (b) Modern sector enrichment,
where growth accrues to those already in the modern sector; and (c) Modem
sector enlargement, wherein: development proceeds by absorbing a.n ever
increasing number of traditional sector workers into an enlarged modern sector.
The distributional consequenceA of each of these types of growth were
analyzed according to two alternative approaches: an inequality index approach
and an axiomatic approach.

The inequality index approach holds that social

welfare is a positive :function of the level of national income and a negative
function of inequality in the distribution of that income.

The specific

inequality measures considered in this paper were the Gini coefficient and
the share of income accruing to the poorest 40%.
The axiomatic approach, in contrast, sets forth specific qualitative
propositions about social well-being.

In this paper, we postulated three

such value judgments: (a) For any given income distribution pattern, social
welfare is greater the higher the ltrvel of' income; (b) For any given income
level, social welfare is greater the more equally national income is distributed
(equality being defined in terms of Lorenz curves); and (c) Any Pareto
improvement improves social welfare~
The results of the comparison of the inequality index and axiomatic
approaches in the three development typologies were decidedly mixed.
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In the case of traditional sector enrichment growth, there was no problem.
For this type of development, the faster growth proceeds, the better things
are, according to both approaches.
In modern sector enrichment growth, there was a discrepancy.

This type

of economic development is unambiguously a good thing according to the axiomatic
approach.

The inequality index approach, however, is ambiguous --- it registers

a welfare gain from the rising income level and a welfare loss from the rising
measured inequality, and without :further specifying the social welfare function,
there is no basis for weighing the two.

It seemed, though, that relative

income considerations could perhaps justify the resulting ambiguity.
For modern sector enlargement growth, there was the same ambiguity, but
in this case the discrepancy could n(:>t be justified.

It appeared that the

rising Gini coefficient end fa.lling share of the poorest 40% in the early stages
of this type of growth were nothing more than statistical artifacts without
social welfare contente

In other words, the riBing measured inequality in this

type of growth reflects a natural ar..d highly desirable pattern when modern
sector enlargement is taking place.
The practical implication of this finding is that we should not automatically
interpret a rising Gini coefficient or other inequality measure as an economically
meaningful worsening of a country's income distribution until we know what type
of economic development pattern that country has been following. 1

Rising

measured inequality could result trom either: Traditions.l sector impoverishmen~ ,
which is clearly undesirable; Modern sector enrichment, which the axiomatic
approach holds is desirable but can reasonably be challenged on relative
income grounds; or the early stages of Modern sector enlargement, which is
clearly desirable, and is probably the way in which many countries are developing.

1

'l'his point pertains to the Ahluwalia-Chen ery growth index as well.

See belo1

-44To ascertain which of these three economic developnent typologies a. realworl.d country most closely fits, the three pure cases .rere synthesized, and
formulas were given for determining the percentage contribution of each
sector's growth to the overall total..

This methodology provides a practical

means of arriving at a qualitative assessment of the distribution of the benefits
of growth for any given country.
In addition, the methodology developed here also affords a. means of testing
various hypotheses about the relationship between income inequ&l.ity and growth
a.cross cowitries for

fil

economic development typologies.

Among the questions

that might be addressed in a cross section of less developed coUJ1tries are the
following:
(a.) Is there a. systematic rela.tj,onship between the-percentage importance
of each type of growth in various countries (as measured by
the level of growth?

q,

B, and o) and

In particular• is a. higher percentage of modern sector

enrichment growth correlated with a higher growth rate, or is the reverse
the case?
(b) Is there a systematic relationship between the percentage importance
of ea.ch type of growth and the level of income, perhaps analogous to the
"inverted-U" pattern?
(c) Is there a systematic relationship between (i) the percentage importance
and (ii) the level of each type of growth, and the types of policies followed,
e.g.• exchange rate policy• tax reform, land redistribution• or educational policy?
Past investigations have met with a notable lack of success in answering
questions of this sort, particularly in relating the distribution of the
benefits of growth to the level of growth. l

Perhaps tests using the methodology

devised above will meet with a better fate.

1

see • for instance, the study by Ahluwalia. (1974) , who concluded: ''We do
not really know what relationships exist between growth and income distribution°"

-45Finally • the methodology of this paper was compared with that recently
suggested by Ahluwalia and Chenery.

The two approaches differ in a number of

respects I most importantly in the fa.ct that the Ahluwa.lia-Chene ry- index has
both the advantage and the disadvantage of relying on obviously arbitrary
weights assigned to income growth of different quintiles.
insofar

This is advantageous

as it makes welfare judsments explicit• and it is certainly a great

improvement over a simple GNP approach for eva.lua.ting economic growth.
However, as with all explicitly arbitra.ry measures ( for instance, that suggested
by Atkinson (1970) , we do not yet hEl.ve a firm theoretical basis for arriving
at the specific weights to be used.

A

potentially fruitful direction for future study might be to try to

merge the growth decomposition methodology devised in this paper with the
Ahluwalia-Chen ery procedure for numerically comparing various dev·elopment
strategies.

This could conceivably result in a subjectively-de fined welfare

index based upon the growth in size and income of the various sectors or
income sources of the economy.

This awaits additional research.
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APPENDIX A

This and the following three appendices prove several theorems from
Sections II and III in the text concerning the relationship between
various types of dualistic economic development and measured inequality.
We suppose there are two sectors:
and low-paying traditional sector (t).
denoted by Wm and Wt, re,spectively.

a high~paying modern sector (m)
The wages paid in each sector are

Their ;respective sizes are denoted

by? and ft, where £111 +ft= P, total population.
The relevant economic magnitudes are national income (Y), share
received by the lowest 40% (S), and the Gini coefficient (G).
of the above notation, we have:
(A,, l)

s

(A.2) a)

=

40%PWt

ft ~ 40%,

if

y

... ...

s

b)

(A.3)

G=

=

...

f ...W.. + ( 40%P - f'")W..;
y

t

t t

,.m

{.!. -[! i_ !.I_+ ! L
2

2P

Y

• .m..m

if

ft< 40%,

,.m

t t

i_wr_) + _r .!!..!_J}/1/2
2P
Y
PY

In terms

For simplicity, we will henceforth assume that the traditional sector
always comprises at least 40%, so that (A.2.a) always holds.
In this appendix, we demonstrate the validity of four propositions
concerning traditional sector enrichment growth:
Proposition A.l:

A higher rate of traditional sector enrichment

growth leads to a higher level of national income (Y) and a higher share
of national income accruing to the poorest 40% (S), and therefore an unambiguously higher level of social welfare (W) according to (la)

s

W = f(Y,S), fl> O, f
2
Proof:
(A.4)

~

Substituting (A.l) int<> (A.2.a), we have:

s

40%PWt
= -----:Wmf m + Wtft

0

Differentiating (A.4) with respect to Wt gives

Also,

aY

f t > 0•

Since

and we have just seen that all four right hand side terms are positive, it

aw 8
awt

follows that - - >

o.
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Proposition A.2:

A higher rate of traditional sector enrichment

growth leads to a higher level of national income (Y) and a lower Gini
coefficient (G), and therefore an unambiguously higher level of social
welfare (W) according to (lb)
Proof:

WG = f(Y,G), f

1

>

O, f

2

~

Partial differentiation of (A. 3) with respect to Wt yields
[-2P(w'11-w1x?) 3 - WtP 2?(P-?) - P2 (rf-wt)fm(P-t1)J
[WtP2 + P(Wm__ wt )?]2

which is clearly negative.
From (lb~, we have
awG
awG ay
awG aG
We see that the first two terms of the right
awt = ~ awt + ~ awt •
c1WG
hand side are positive, the second two negative, and therefore t
> O.
aw
Proposition A.3:

A higher rate of traditional sector enrichment

growth leads to higher social welfa~ according to the axiomatic system
( 2a-c).
Proof:

A higher rate of traditional sector enrichment growth is

a Pareto-superior situation, which by (2c), signals rising social welfare.
Since social welfare is not reduced by one of the other axioms, social
welfare is increased by a higher rate of traditional sector enrichment
growth.
Proposition A.4:

The inequality index approaches to social welfare

(eq. (la) and (lb)) and the axiomatic approach (2) are in complete agreement for traditional sector enrichment growth.
Proof:

This follows directly from Propositions (A.1)-(A.3).
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APPENDIX B

In this appendix, we prove the two parts of the theorem of Section II. B.
Proposition B.l:

The higher the rate of modern sector enrichment

growth, the higher is social welfare according to the axiomatic approach.
Proof:
Same argument as in proof of Proposition A.3.

Proposition B.2:

The higher the rate of modern sector enrichment

growth, there is no unambiguous change in social welfare according to
the inequality index approach based on the share of income received by
the poorest 40%:
ws = f(Y ,S), fl > o,_f2 ~ -

(la)

Differentiating (A.4) with respect to

Proof:

vf1,

we have

aws .
ence' - - is the sum of one
awm
we further specify
unless
therefore
and
positive and one negative term,
as _ -40%Pwttn
< O•
y2
awm -

Al

ay _ ..m
so ' awm - r > O•

H

the social welfare function, the social welfare effect of moder~1 sector
enrichment growth is ambiguous according to the income share approach.
Proposition B,3:

The higher the rate of modern sector enrichment

growth, there is no unambiguous change in social welfare according to the
inequality index approach based on the Gini coefficient:
G
W = f(Y,G), f

(lb)
Proof:

1

>

0, f 2 < 0,

Partially differentiating (A.3) with respect to
aG

[2P(w°-Wt)(fm) 3 + WtP 2tt1(P-fm)]
[WtP2 + p(if1.. wt )fm]2

if!, we

obtain
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which is the ratio of two positive numbers.

awG
ay

and - -

ay
awm

awG
aG

and~ are positive but - - <

awm

awG
a~

Since -

o,

=

awG _ay
ay awm

+

awG aG
aG awm

--

we have the same ambiguity

as with the income share approach for this type of growth.
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APPENDIX C

In this appendix, we prove the theorem of Section II.C.

We begin

with:
Proposition C.l:

The higher the rate of modern sector enlargement

growth, the higher is social welfare according to the axiomatic approach.
Pr•oof:
Sarne argument as in proof of Proposition A.3.

Proposition C.2:

(a)

In the early stages of modern sector enlarge-

ment growth, a higher rate of this type of growth leads to a higher level
of national income (Y), a lower share of national income accruing to the
poorest 40% {S), and therefore an ambiguous effect on social welfare according
to (la)

w6

= f(Y,S), f 1 ~ f 2 ~-·

(b) Only when the traditional sector

is less than 40% of the population is a higher modern sector enlargement
growth rate unambiguously better according to (la).
Proof:

1

(a) From the definition of S for ft> 40% (eq. (A.2.a)), it is

evident that in the early stages of modern sector enlargement growth, the
poorest 40% receive the same absolute amount from a larger whole, and therefore

1This result may be generalized as follows: If our measure of inequality
is the share of income accruing to the poorest X%, that share falls continu
ously \llltil the modern sector has grown to include (l-X)% of the population.
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their share falls.

(b) In the late~ stages of modern sector enlargement

growth (i.e., for ft< 40%), equation (A.2.b) applies.

Differentiating

t

(A.2.b) with respect to f , we derive

since the bracketed terms are both positive.

By the chain rule,

as
as aft
as
as
t
- - = - - - - = - - - , we see that - - > 0 for f < 40%, as was to be proved.
a?
aft a?
aft
a?
Proposition C.3:

(a) In the early stages of modern sector enlargement

growth, a higher rate of this type ~f growth leads to a higher level of
national income (Y); a higher Gini c.oefficient (G), and therefo1~e an
ambiguous effect on social welfare a_c_c_o_r_d_i_n..:::g;;.......t_o_(,,,,,l,,,,,b,,,,,)~W_G_=_f--'-(Y-.<..,G_) , f
1
(b) Only when the modern sector is greater than[

/wm•i-wt
t

>

o, f 2 < o.

J percent of the

w"1-w
population does a higher modern sector enlargement growth rate lead to an
unambiguous improvement according to (lb).
Proof:

These two propositions may be proven simultaneously by demon

strating that G reaches a maximum for some value o f ; strictly between
aG

fffi

· a 2G

This requires that - - = 0 for O < - < 1 and - - - - < o.
a?
p
a(fm) 2
Differentiating (A,3) with respect to £111 and rearranging, we obtain
zero and one.

(C . l)
A

'
maximum,

oG

--=

a?

1' f

{

[w111 _ Wt]

}{_ 2£11lwtp2 + P3Wt
[WtP2 + P(vr°-wt)£111J2 -(t111)2P(w"1-wt) }.

i't exists,
'
aG- = O•
occurs at -

a?

Since the first tenn in brackets

is strictly positive, we need only work with the second term.

Setting it
·n

equal to zero and applying the quadratic formula to solve for f', we find
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t1'1

It is evident that one of the roots, (P)C =
so must be rejected.

-wt _ /w¾t
t
,
'rl°-w
t1'1

Considering now the other root,

is negative,

<r>c

=

IN-wt ,
\/'1-wt

fact that Wm> Wt implies both nwnerator and denominator are positive
therefore

t1'1

(P)C

<

1.

<f >c

>

o.

Likewise,

vf1 > Wt implies [wiii;t

<

vf',

the
and

and therefore

~
t1'1
Thus, G achieves a critical value for some {P)C,O
< (P)C < 1.

This cr•itical value is a maximum provided the second order condition,
2
a
G
- - - < O, is satisfied. Differentia ting (C.l) again and rearranging ,

a<t1'1)2

we find

is indeed a maximum as claimed.
Proposition C.4:

In modern secTor enlargement growth, there are three

phases, with the following discrepanci es:
Phase I

Phase II

fwmwt_wt
•.m

t

w -W

<

t'1

-p

Phase III
< 60%
-

Income Level (Y)

Rises

Rises

Rises

Gini Coefficient (G)

Rises

Falls

Falls

Income Share of
Poorest 40% (S)

Falls

Falls

Rises

Effect on Social
Welfare According
to Gini Coefficient
Approach

Ambiguous

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Effect on Social
Welfare According to
the Income Share
Approach

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Effect on Social
Welfare According to
the Axiomatic Approach
Proof:

Unambiguous
Improvement

Follows directly from Proposition s (C.1)-(C.3) .
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In this appendix, we prove the validity of the theorems of Section III,
taking as our measure of inequality the Gini coefficient.i

The strategy

of the proof is to derive an expression for the change in the Gini coeffi
cient with an increase in the size of the modern sector when there is
within-sector inequality, and then to demonstrate that a maximurr value
always exists for a positive fraction of the population, irregardless of
the relative sizes of the within-sector inequality coefficients.
Let us suppose that modern sector enlargement growth takes place
under the following conditions:
(i) The income distribution within the modern sector is fixed, that
is, the frequency distribution of wages in that sector (Fm) remains the
same over time, which implies that the mean wage earned by those in the
modern sector (iifil) and the Gini coefficient of those working in the modern
sector (G

m* )

also are constant.

(ii) Similarly, the income distribution within the traditional sector,
t
and therefore F,

t
W
,

ti'
and G also remain constant.

(iii) The lowest income in the modern sector is greater than the
highest income in the traditional sector.

2

(iv) Population is constant and normalized at l; the population
shares of the modern and traditional sectors are given by

f"1

and ft,

respectively.
(v) Growth takes place by enlarging the modern sector, i.e., by

1

The choice of the Gini coefficient is arbitrary; any other inequality
measure might also have been chosen. The Gini coefficient is considered
here, because it is the most widely used.
2
This assumption is not crucial to the analysis, but it greatly
eases the algebra.
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increasin g fm.
The methodolo gy here draws on a procedure developed by Fei and Ranis
(1974) for decomposi ng total inequalit y into its various component parts.

Suppose that we were to array the populatio n in increasin g order of income.
Then Fei and Ranis show:
( D. l)

G

=

Ii cj,iGi

( D. 2)

Gi

-

G1 R1

•

I

• I

and ther•efore ,

( D. 3)
where

G

G

= Gini coefficie nt of total income,

Gi

= Gini coefficie nt of income from the i'th source, includinp
those who have no income from that source,

cj,i

= Share of the i'th factor or sector in total income,

i•

R

= Rank correlati on between the total incomes of individua ls
or groups and their incomes from the i' th source,

1

Gi

= "Pseudo-G ini coeffici1m t 11 of the i 'th income source, obtained
by computing a Gini coefficie nt with the individua ls or groups
ordered according to total income rather than income from
that source.

Fei and Ranis have applied this procedure to the decompos ition of total
inequalit y into its various factor componen ts.
The same methodolo gy, appropria tely modified, may be applied to the
growth of various sectors.

Under the condition s of modern sector enlarge

ment growth just assumed, in particula r condition (iii), it follows that
Gi'

= Gi

and Ri'

=l

for all i, and therefore (D.1)-(D. 3) reduce to
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(D.4)

G =

l

$iGi,

i
using the true Gini coeffic ients instead of the pseudo -Ginis.
Suppos e now we have only two sector s, a modern sector and traditi onal
sector , with respec tive income distrib utions F111 and Ft, and compri sing
m
f and f t percen t of the labor force respec tively. The factor share
of
each sector is the average wage multip lied by the fractio n of the labor
force in that sector , all divided by total income , which gives us in
place
of (D.4):
(D.5)

G

=

Recall that the sector Gini cc,effi cients Gm and Gt include person s
with no income from that source. Letting Gm* and Gti; represe nt the
Gini
coeffic ients includ ing only people with income from that sector , and
assumi ng.
the two sectors to be mutual ly exclus ive, it may be shown that

(D.6)

Gm*

=

Gm-ft
1-ft

and

t~';

G

=

Gt-?

3

1-?1

3

The Gini coeffic ient of a var•iab le Xis equal to l-2B, where Bis the
area under the Lorenz curve of X. It is easily establi shed geome trically that
1
(X. l+x. 2)(±.)
1 l
(X.+l+ ••• +x )(n)
Xj·H(~ )
J+
J+
n
J
B = - ~ X + x + • • • + X ) /Y +
n
y
+
y
+ ••• +
2 n 1
y
2
n
where n is the total number of perE",ons or familie s, j is the number
who have no
income from that source , and Y is total income. The above express ion
may be
rearran ged to yield
B = 12 + ly [(n - j - 1)x. l + (n - j - 2)X.
+ .•• + X ].
n
n
J+
J+ 2
n
If we now consid er only the n-j person s who have positiv e incomes from
that
source , and let G* be the Gini coeffic ient among those same n-j person
s, then
G* = 1 - 2B*, where
1

l
~ - - - + ----2(n-j)
(n-j)Y [(n-J·-1 )X j+l + (n-J"-2) X.J+ 2 + ••• + Xn ].
Denote the term in bracke ts by Z. Then
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We now wish to solve for Gin terms of the parameters of the model
and the proportion of workers in the modern sector labor force.

Solving

(D.6) for Gm and Gt and substituting the results along with Y = tfl? + Wtft
and ft= 1 -

t1'1

into (D.5), we obtain

(D.7)

+£111(w111-2W~Gt* + Wt)

+W-tGt*

The Kuznets turning point exists if G has an interior maximum, i.e.,
if the first derivative attains a zero value at a critical value of~,

--- ....
,
(D.8)

~-

1.U

~
a?

2

= Y[2£111A + B] - [£111

.,l1l
.1.

,

---

Wt::

.,.,

•

UJ.Jld..1.U

A + fmB + WtGt*J[tfl-Wt]

Y2

Equating (D.8) to zero and rearranging yields

(D.9)

2

~ [A(Wm-Wt)J + ~[2AWt]
+ [BWt - (Wm-Wt)WtGt*J = 0
1
2Z
G=l
n - -nY

and

~

G--

= 1 - -1

n-j

2Z

- ...,.___,..,.._
(n-j )Y •

Solving these two equations for Z, equating the resulting expressions to one
anothe1•, and solving the result for· G*, we obtain
Gn-j
n-j •

Q.E.D.
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Applying the quadratic formula and combining terms, we find

(D.10)

~

-t

= -2AW ±

c·

- 4ABw11wt + 4Aw11 wtGt*
2
-t 2 + 4AW t 3Gt*
-8Aw~~t
w Gt* + 4ABW
2A(w11 - Wt)

Since A < 0, the denominator of (D.10) is negative and the first term in
the numerator is positive.

If f~ is to lie between O and 1, the numerator

must be negative, and therefore the only potentially meaningful root is

(D.11)

~ =
C

-t

-w

w -w-t

~.m

If the critical value (D.11) is to be economically relevant, it must
be positive and less than one.

Denoting the term under the square root sign

by C, ~ will be positive if C
(D.12)

>

(AWt) 2 , which is easily demonstrat~d:
2

...

2

.,,

C-(AWt) = -ABw11wt + Afi'8 WtGt .. - 2Aw11wt Gt•'
~2

+ABW'-

_._3

.,_-1,,

+ AW'- G'- ..
,

2

2

= -ABWt(Wm-Wt) + AWtGt~(w11 -2~t+Wt )
= AWt(w11-wt)[·-B+Gt*cw'1-wt)]
= AWt(w11-wt)(w'1+wt)(l-Gt*>
To show~ is less than one, we req~ire
(D.13)

-wt _ le

<

A

rcA<
.fc

wm _ wt

-m

W

< -Aw'1
2

2
C < A w11 ,

>

o.
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which may be shown as follows:

as was to be proved.
We have therefore shown that when there is within-sector inequality
in modern sector enlargement growth, there is always an inverted U-pattern
of measured inequality, regardless of whether incomes are distributed more
equally, less equally, or the same within the modern sector as in the tra
ditional sector.

m*
case G

It should be noted that Proposition (C.3) is the special

= Gt* = o.
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